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For those interested in such things, it sometimes seems the rush of Soviet artists, actors, athletes and performers to "escape" socialist paradise is reaching epidemic proportions.

In relatively recent times three from the Bolshoi ballet defected, Czech hockey players, chess wizards, various writers and intellectual dissenters have fled, and now two top Soviet ice skaters have rejected Communism.

More and more Soviet citizens are finding they've had a bellyful of totalitarianism and prefer to live in the West. Strangely, from our death-wish point of view, we often accept the view that they *don't* escape for political reasons, but in search of "artistic freedom" which the Soviets invariably translate as being decadent, venal and money-hungry.

While it sometimes seems the USSR is falling apart (after over 60 years of absolute power the Soviet system is still incapable of adequately housing, clothing and feeding its own people, and requires Western food, technological and material aid and trade in order to function).

Amid the rash of defections there is one group from which defections have actually *diminished* in recent years — the most important area of all: the Soviet intelligence and espionage establishment.

It used to be that there was always a small but steady flow of disaffected KGB and GRU (military intelligence) officers coming to the West with details of what the Soviet spy system was up to. It was an invaluable source of vital information.

Contrary to public opinion which often assumes we have our spies inside the Soviet system too, we don't have anyone in the Kremlin. The Soviet heirarchy is virtually impenetrable for outsiders. Apart from the spy technology of satellites and expert analysis, the West has no way of learning Soviet long-range plans.

We used to be able to count on high-level defectors to provide inside information — and to reveal details of what the KGB was up to. In fact defectors have been the secret weapon of our security — we'd be lost without them.

Why has the flow of KGB officers decreased while the influx of other defectors stepped up? Simple. Because of all Soviet agencies, the KGB knows best how crippled, how flabby, how hesitant the West has become.

There is no faith any more in Western liberal resolve to stand up to tyranny. Our will has been undermined, our determination sapped. Especially in America, which is still reeling from Vietnam. It is now physically dangerous to be an ally of America, which has the *appearance* of being soft, irresolute, confused, unsure.

None would be more aware of this than Soviet intelligence officers who have special inside knowledge and who know their lives will be forever in jeopardy if they change sides. The KGB never forgets, never forgives, and its history of "eliminating" enemies (once the job of *SMERSH*) is legendary.

One can argue that *without* a continuous flow of intelligence defectors coming to the West, our own security is incapable of protecting us.

Curiously the *first* post-war defector, Igor Gouzenko, whose information in 1944 revealed a massive Soviet spy ring in the West (which was never fully investigated and was covered-up as soon as conveniently possible) has been trying for nearly 35 years to persuade the West to protect itself. To little avail. Why, even the Gouzenko papers which should have been declassified in 1976 have been "re-classified" because some of the names mentioned, but who were never investigated, are now in senior positions.

Ironically, in the early 1950s Gouzenko proposed a "Five-Point Program" which he said would ensure a continual flow of high level Soviet defectors. (Like most who come here, Gouzenko dislikes the term "defector," which implies something dishonorable; he prefers "escaper" which is what someone is who becomes disgusted with tyranny and oppression and seeks freedom).

Gouzenko still campaigns for his Five-Point Program: "Not only would it work — it can't fail." Basically he advocates:

1. *High level defectors with information useful to the nation should be given "friendly" protection — something Gouzenko feels he has not always received in Canada.*
2. *A valuable or useful defector should be granted immediate citizenship and protection.*
3. *The person should get financial support from the state so a degree of security is assured.*
4. *The person should be given work according to his or her abilities, so as to continue feeling productive and useful.*
5. *The person should receive a document or award indicating the gratitude of the nation for the service rendered, often at considerable personal risk.*

These terms are simple and straightforward, and have always been recognized as reasonable from the time they first appeared in an interview in *U.S. News and World Report*. Yet no country has ever implemented them as policy, which Gouzenko, as a former GRU officer, feels would guarantee a continual flow of ranking intelligence officers to the West.

No Western government has ever seen fit to implement such a program. And today, when America seems to have lost its sense of direction and will, and the flow of disillusioned KGB officers and Soviet officials has slowed to a trickle while the numbers of those disillusioned with the Soviet system increases steadily, the need for an inducement becomes more apparent.

It is fashionable to ignore Gouzenko these days, even though evidence points to the validity of his assessments. In fact he remains the closest thing we have ever had in Canada to a first-hand insight into the strange, convoluted workings of the Soviet intelligence psyche. The pity is that we, in Canada, have never used his expertise to advantage. And the West in general has shied from actually encouraging those on the other side to come over and help us defend our values.

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

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NATO. It was during this period, Golitsin later said, that he became fed up with the Soviet system and decided to offer his services to the other side. With that aim in mind, he began searching the intelligence reports for clues to the identities of the KGB's sources and memorizing the contents of documents pilfered from NATO files.

Golitsin's chance came in 1961, when he was given his new identity as Klimov and dispatched with his wife and child to the KGB station in Helsinki. The CIA did not draw the connection between the Golitsin of Vienna and the Klimov of Helsinki and again made no attempt to recruit him. Golitsin finally took matters into his own hands and defected. "It was quite a shock," a CIA officer said.

The CIA appeared to have been handed a major triumph in the espionage wars. Almost in spite of itself the Agency had latched onto a source who claimed to be capable of exposing Soviet spies throughout the Western world. There was the usual danger that Golitsin might be a KGB disinformation agent and not a bona fide defector, but his handlers quickly satisfied themselves on that score. "The amount of information we got from Golitsin in the first forty-eight hours of his interrogation established in most people's minds that he was for real," a CIA officer said. "We knew quite a bit about the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, and we were able to check his information against what we already knew."

The biggest problem with Golitsin was not his bona fides but his behavior. Defectors are a notoriously difficult lot to handle, and Golitsin was no exception. "There is no such thing as a normal defector," a chief of the CIA's Soviet Bloc Division said. "He defects for a series of reasons usually having to do with serious psychological problems. There is something wrong with him in the first instance. The fact is that the guy is sick and temperamental. The Canadian government has spent something like seven million dollars trying to settle Gouzenko down. He's a drunk who would go out and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars. But he is also a showcase character who fled from terror, and the Canadians don't want the negative side to get out. He's been one of the biggest thorns in the side of the Canadian government they've ever had, but on the other hand, his information was great." The United States experi-

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enced similar though less costly problems with Goleniewski. According to Howard Roman, "Goleniewski got into quite a psychological tizzy during his interrogations. He used to play Victrola records of old European songs at top volume and drink booze." Goleniewski would later insist that he was the last of the Romanovs and that Henry Kissinger was a Soviet agent.

As for Golitsin, he was "diagnosed by a psychiatrist and separately by a clinical psychologist as a paranoid," said John Hart, a CIA officer who conducted an extensive review of the Agency's handling of defectors. Peer de Silva, the onetime chief of operations for the Soviet Bloc Division, called Golitsin "a total son of a bitch." An aide to Angleton put it more delicately: "Golitsin was a very difficult individual to accommodate." Another counterintelligence officer said that "at first SB [Soviet Bloc Division] handled him, but he just refused to cooperate with a whole series of SB case officers who he insisted were idiots. He demanded access to the highest levels of the U.S. government." John Hart said that Golitsin "basically insisted that he wanted to deal only with the President of the United States."

Finally, Golitsin was handed over to Angleton, commencing one of the most extraordinary relationships in the history of the secret war between the CIA and the KGB. In Golitsin, Angleton found a defector whose dire warnings of Soviet machinations conformed to his own vision of fiendishly subtle KGB plots. According to Hart, Golitsin's warnings "centered around the idea that the KGB had vast resources which it was using to deceive not only the U.S. government but other Western governments. This plot was masterminded by something called the KGB Disinformation Directorate, and this KGB Disinformation Directorate was able to deceive the West . . . because of the fact that it had penetrations at high levels, both within the intelligence services of these countries, including our own, but also in high places in the governments of the various countries." Coming so soon after the Goleniewski case and the arrests of Blake, Lonsdale, and Felfe, Golitsin's message was a compelling one, particularly for Angleton.

"Golitsin became the swami as far as Jim was concerned," de Silva said. "Angleton made a career out of Golitsin," a chief of

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